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Abstract: 
 
In the U.S., there is a strong passion for professional baseball, football, and, increasingly hockey.  An interesting 
issue is whether this passion diminished during the recession of 2007-2009, the worst since the Great 
Depression, or remained the same.  This study investigates the impact of economic downturns on the 
professional sports industry.  In particular, it examines whether the National Football League, National Hockey 
League, and Major League Baseball are recession proof (i.e. minimally impacted by recessions).  Using 
regression analysis, this study explores the effect of recession and other factors on U.S. attendance and league 
revenue for the three professional leagues from 1990 to 2012.  While much research has been done concerning 
whether other industries are recession proof, not much information exists discussing whether the sports industry 
is recession proof.    
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Americans have a passion for professional sports.  Baseball is “America’s Pastime”, 
Sunday afternoons and evenings are traditionally dedicated to football games, and hockey is 
becoming more popular, especially in the Eastern United States, as the Canadian influence 
transcends international borders.  According to ESPN (2013), in 2007 alone, over 17 million 
people attended National Football League (NFL) games, more than 77 million fans attended 
Major League Baseball (MLB) games within the United States, and over 15 million 
Americans attended National Hockey League (NHL) matches.  However, Americans are still 
feeling the effects of the worst recession since the Great Depression.  WR Hambrecht and 
Company Sports Finance (2012, p. 4) reflected on the 2007 to 2009 recession saying, “While 
the length of the recession was not unique or overly lengthy from a historical perspective, 
what is most alarming is the snail’s pace of growth in the wake of the crisis.”  Below is a 
graph displaying the total/overall league attendance per year for the three leagues during this 
financial crisis.   
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Table 1 (ESPN) 
 
 
The table above indicates how attendance levels for American teams, although 
decreasing slightly at points from 2006 to 2012, remained fairly stable throughout the 
recession.  Therefore, there is evidence, from the most recent recession, that the sports 
industry may possibly be recession proof.  For the purpose of this study, a recession proof 
industry will be defined as an “industry that is minimally impacted by economic downturn . . 
.” (Manuel, 2014).  Further, a sports industry that is “minimally impacted” by economic 
downturn and is thus recession proof has revenue and attendance figures that still reflect 
growth, even if these figures are growing at a lower rate.  This is based on Michael 
Urquhart’s (1981) definition of recession proof. 1  Moreover, this study will explore whether 
these industries have been minimally impacted by recessions, as indicated by their attendance 
and revenue data, or whether they have been heavily affected by recessions.  Evidence 
                                                          
1Michael Urquhart (1981) finds that recession proof is “The combination of steady growth and relative cyclical 
insensitivity . . . however, certain qualifying factors are necessary. The rate of growth is reduced during 
downturns, and some components of this division are more cyclically sensitive than others.”  Some definitions 
argue that recession proof means that an industry must be completely resistant to all economic downturns. This 
is too strict of a definition for the purpose of this study.   
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towards recession proof leagues comes from data provided by Forbes (2013) which indicates 
that from 2007 to 2008, right in the middle of the recession, total league revenue for the MLB 
climbed from $5,900,909,733 to $6,021,826,532 (2.04%), while the NHL’s total league 
revenue also slightly rose from $2,284,401,772 to $2,286,310,622.2  The NFL total league 
revenue grew most substantially from 2007 to 2008 by 2.89% from $7,850,900,000 to 
$8,077,799,000.3  This data highlights how as families tried to make every dollar go a little 
further, when unemployment was pervasive, and when certain activities had to be eliminated 
because of constraining finances, people still attended NFL, NHL, and MLB games.  This 
warrants a few questions:   
1. Starting in 2007, did fewer people attend professional athletic events than when 
the country is not in a recession?  Is it only for particular leagues that attendance 
decreased?   
2. Are fewer people still attending these events today because of the recession? 
3. Do organizations have to increase ticket prices during recessions in order to 
maintain revenue?   
4. Are certain professional sports leagues more recession-proof than other 
professional sports leagues? 
Through this study, some of the questions listed above will be answered while 
different questions will also be addressed.  To determine if the NFL, NHL, and MLB are 
recession proof, this study will compare data from the 1990-1991, 2001, and 2007-2009 
recessions to data from non-recessionary years.  These are considered official recession years 
by the National Bureau of Economic Research (2010).  The data for each variable will only 
correspond to American teams.   
                                                          
2 This includes only American teams’ data.  
3
 These numbers, like all numbers in this study, are measured in 2012 American dollars. 
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The format of this paper is as follows: Section II reviews related literature.  A model 
of attendance and revenue is provided in Section III.  Data used in the analysis are described 
in Section IV.  Section V discusses regression estimates of the models.  The concluding 
section is a summary of the paper with some analysis and insights into the results from the 
regression.   
 
II. Literature Review 
Several studies have been conducted that are related to this study.  While some of 
them do not pertain to professional sports, they are relevant as they analyze factors that 
influence industries within a recessionary period.   
According to the National Bureau of Economic Research (2010), a recession is 
defined as a “decline in economic activity spread across the economy, lasting more than a 
few months, normally visible in real GDP, real income, employment, industrial production, 
and wholesale-retail sales”.  In regards to the sports industry, particularly the NFL, NHL, and 
MLB, K.C. Joyner (2008) hypothesized that the only U.S. recession that affected the National 
Football League was the 1973-1975 recession.  Joyner explains, “. . . attendance dropped by 
4.6% from 1973 to 1975 . . . this last bit of information shows that while the league hasn’t 
been completely recession proof, it has weathered these financial storms”.  In contrast, Koba 
(2013) believes that the National Hockey League is the only recession proof league from 
2007 to 2012 because, despite an increase in ticket prices, attendance remained steady.  He 
attributes this trend to hockey fans being more financially affluent than other sports fans.  
Lastly, MLB saw record breaking revenues in 2009, thus underscoring how it, too, may be 
recession proof.     
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A. Factors that Influence Attendance and Revenue: 
Borland (2006, p. 23) identifies various factors which contribute to professional sports 
league revenue such as the price of a single game ticket, sales of television/internet rights, 
and merchandise sales.  Downward and Dawson (2000, p.116) also identify various elements 
which influence attendance at games.  Those include market size, price of tickets, and 
income.  Downward and Dawson further explain, “. . . market size is a ubiquitously 
significant determinant of demand”.  These authors conduct an empirical analysis of how 
these listed factors affect attendance and revenue.  Despite their data not reflecting a 
recessionary period, their study provides a model of factors that influence attendance and 
revenue.  Rottenberg (2001, p. 7) further elaborates, “Attendance at baseball games, as a 
whole, is a function of the general level of income, the price of admission to games . . . is a 
positive function of the size of the population of the territory in which the team” plays.  
Rottenberg highlights that from 1931 to 1950 attendance to games in New York City was 
27,270,000 while in St. Louis attendance was only 4,160,000.   
Welki and Zlatoper (2001) present a regression analysis on various factors which 
influence NFL attendance.  They only focus on the 1991 season.  The model used in their 
study has game-day attendance as the dependent variable and price of tickets, real per capita 
income, price of parking at one game, season’s winning proportion of the home team prior to 
game day, season’s winning proportion of the visiting team prior to the game, number of 
regular season games played, temperature, whether the game is in a dome, whether teams are 
in the same division, whether the game is on Sunday or not, Sunday night games, and if the 
game is a blackout on television as independent variables.   
WR Hambrecht and Co. Sports Finance Group (2012, p. 32), in their analysis of 
descriptive statistics, concludes that the “US sports market is an incredibly unique sector for a 
multitude of reasons, the most significant of which is that it is highly resistant to the ebbs and 
6 
 
flows of the economy overall”.  The study goes on to say that “attendance and overall spend 
[sic] has continued to rise despite the recent economic recession”.  Attendance records and 
average ticket prices for the NHL, MLB, and NHL from 2006 through 2012 are also 
provided.  The strength of this study comes from its franchise valuations which reflect a 
steady increase in team values from 2006 to 2012.  As league revenue and average operating 
income per league is further explored, WR Hambrecht asserts that revenue has remained 
fairly stable.  Team valuations cover every team in the NFL, MLB and NHL which draws a 
nice comparison between cities and thus population.  The data provided reflects the most 
recent recessionary period, and the study analyzes the trends revealed by that period.  
Noll (2001) also conducts a regression analysis.  He highlights how professional 
sports are able to survive and be profitable based on the demand for them.  He commences by 
going through the a priori factors or independent variables that go into the demand for a 
game: a good game versus a bad game, population of the city the game is played in, team 
quality, price of ticket, the stadium/arena the game is played in, weather conditions, racial 
composition of a city and whether it is a playoff game.  Pricing and attendance are the 
dependent variables.  Noll then presents the regression results for MLB attendance for the 
1970 and 1971 seasons.  He finds that there is a negative correlation between income and 
attendance which highlights that baseball is a “working-class sport”.   
Noll also studies the demand for NFL games; he notes that in 1970, roughly two-
thirds of teams were completely sold out or within only a few thousand fans of doing so.  A 
regression for the results of the 1970 NFL season attendance is also presented.  Football 
attendance negatively correlates with income just like baseball.  This is because football is 
associated with lower per capita income fans and is predominately popular in Southern cities.  
Noll provides the same regression analysis for NHL game attendance for the 1972-1973 
season.  Hockey is a much more regionally based than other sports; it is mostly popular in the 
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Northern U.S. and Canada.  Despite this study not being conducted using recessionary data, it 
is important to note that Noll regards attendance and revenue as key indicators of the success 
of a league or organization.  In turn, those variables are particularly influenced by income and 
the region where the team plays.  For Noll, “Attendance is heavily influenced by the size of 
the cities’ population: the larger the city, the greater the attendance” (204).   
 
B. Analysis from Parallel Industries  
The United States Department of Transportation (2012) explains how the most recent 
recession affected the aviation industry.  Many airlines introduced additional baggage fees 
and reduced the number of flights.  These changes, such as fare increases and capacity 
reductions, are the main factors that enabled this industry to survive the recession.  The U.S. 
sports industry can be compared to the aviation industry in that many teams increased ticket 
prices in order to maintain revenues.  For example, from 2007 to 2008, MLB raised ticket 
prices from $25.21 to $26.98, NHL raised prices from $48.87 to $50.15, and NFL raised 
ticket prices from $74.31 to $76.98 (Fort, 2012).  Despite these being only modest increases, 
many teams also offered promotional incentives in order to get people to attend games.  
According to Britt (2011), “Teams are also doing a lot more promotions in order to get fans 
into the stadium and once at the stadium, there are now a lot more activities to entertain fans 
besides the game itself”.  For instance, the Pittsburgh Penguins (NHL) organized a successful 
campaign with Pizza Hut in which they did commemorative cups featuring different players 
each week.  This, in turn, encouraged fans to attend the games because these cups became a 
collector’s item.  Finally, attendance at sporting events during a recession depends on ticket 
price and income which is similar to the aviation industry’s fee increases and their effects on 
number of people willing to fly.   
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 Legg and Tang (2012) focus on the effect on the gaming industry of the most recent 
recession.  This study declares that the gaming industry is not recession proof.  Its 
methodology is particularly applicable to the current study in that the dependent variable is 
gaming revenue while one of the independent variables is attendees.  The authors use the 
Ordinary Least Squares method, binary recession variables, and annual time-series data for 
2001 to 2010.  Legg and Tang then perform a one way t test on the binary recession variables 
and conclude that the latest recession heavily impacted the gambling industry.   
 In another relevant study, Hiraide (2012) analyzes the auto industry, particularly Ford 
Motor Company, during the most recent recession.  The author asserts, “It is hypothesized in 
this study that the demand for new vehicles is negatively related to vehicle prices and 
gasoline prices and positively related to . . . household income”.  Covering over a twenty year 
period (1990-2010), the author performs a time series analysis of data on Ford.   In the model 
used, sales, which is the number of Ford vehicles sold in North America, is the dependent 
variable.  The independent variables include the average price of Ford vehicles, the average 
price of gasoline in the previous year, the units of single family housing starting in the 
previous year, total non-farm employment (million), and whether the economy was in a 
recession.   
 One final study is comparable to this study in that it explores the variables which 
affect NBA (National Basketball Association) revenue.  Jacobs (2009) studies whether losing 
affects the revenues of a particular NBA franchise.  He uses NBA franchise revenue as the 
dependent variable.  Some of his independent variables for revenue include gate revenue, 
ticket prices, overall league attendance, and national population.  Jacobs predicts that gate 
revenue is to have a positive effect on revenue, and his analysis confirms this hypothesis.  He 
also predicts that attendance will positively affect revenue, and this proves to be true as well.  
According to Jacob’s study, population also positively impacts the revenue of a team.  Lastly, 
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he finds, from his model, that ticket prices have a positive and significant effect on franchise 
revenue.  
 
III. Model  
In Welki and Zlatoper’s study (2001, p. 221), they reference a survey done by 
Schofield (1983b) of factors that affect attendance, and those factors encompass four 
categories, three of which are used in the current study.  The ones used in this study are 
economic variables (e.g., average ticket price, per capita income), demographic variables 
(e.g., total national population), and variables reflecting influences or preferences not already 
accounted for by the other categories (e.g., average ticket price of substitutes such as average 
ticket prices of opposing sports).  Therefore, the model created includes these three categories 
along with recessionary variables (e.g., percentage of a sport season that was during 
recession, unemployment rate) and a variable which indicates the number of teams in a 
league per season.  For the purpose of the current study, variables that will be pulled from the 
Welki and Zlatoper study are price and income; these are independent variables and will be 
used to see what influence they have on attendance which is the dependent variable.  Finally, 
the study presented will use Jacob’s revenue model as the model for overall league revenue 
for the NHL, MLB, and NFL.  The model follows: 
ATTENDANCE= f (PRICE, INCOME, POP, TEAMS, SUBS,               (1) 
RECESS, UNEMPL, LOCKOUT)  
where Table 3 lists the variable names and definitions. 
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Table 3: Description of Attendance Variables 
ATTENDANCE Total League Attendance per year 
PRICE Average Ticket Price per game per season (2012 U.S. Dollars) 
INCOME Real Per Capita U.S. Income per year (2012 U.S. Dollars) 
POP Total National U.S. Population per year 
TEAMS Number of Teams in each league per season 
SUBS Average ticket price of rival sports leagues  (2012 U.S. Dollars) 
RECESS Based on NBER recession years – Percentage of months of a league’s 
season that occurred during a recession  
UNEMPL National U.S. Unemployment Rate per year 
LOCKOUT Dummy variable used to account for NHL lockout years of 1991-1992, 
1994-1995, 2004-2005.  1 = season that followed a recession, 0 = season 
that did not follow a recession. 
 
  For some of these variables, the expected relationship between them and attendance, 
ceteris paribus, is clear.  For other factors, contradictory forces prevent the a priori prediction.  
Therefore, below are the hypothesized relationships between the independent variables and 
total attendance.   
 PRICE is expected to negatively impact total fan attendance to games.  As the average 
ticket price per game increases, fans will opt to attend fewer games.  Differently, the price of 
substitutes will positively affect fan attendance.  As the ticket price of a certain league 
increases, the number of fans attending another league will increase as a result.  For instance, 
if the average ticket prices for NHL and NFL tickets fall, people will opt to attend more NHL 
and NFL games and fewer MLB games as a result.      
 TEAMS will positively affect fan total attendance.  According to MLB, NFL, and 
NHL league history records (2013, 2014), since 1970, the NFL has increased the number of 
teams in the league from 26 to 32, the MLB has increased from 24 to 30, and the NHL has 
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increased from 14 to 30 teams.  In turn, as the number of TEAMS increases so too does total 
league fan attendance because there are additional teams for fans to come and watch.  For 
total national population (POP), it has a positive relationship with attendance.  As the 
population grows, there will be an increased number of fans who attend sporting events.  
The anticipated effect of the remaining independent variables on overall league 
attendance remains unclear.  Welki and Zlatoper, (2001, p. 222) explain, “How changes in 
income (INCOME) will affect game attendance is indeterminate.  There have been mixed 
results in previous research on the relationship between income and attendance at sporting 
events”.  Noll (2001, p. 170) finds a “negative correlation between attendance and income” 
within baseball and football, but not hockey.  Other factors that are also uncertain in their 
effects on overall fan attendance include RECESS and UNEMPL.  However, as for RECESS, 
intuition would say that that during a recession, total fan attendance would decrease.  This is 
exactly what this study will test.  Lastly, UNEMPL mirrors RECESS in that intuition would 
say that the higher the unemployment rate, the fewer the number of people who attend 
sporting events.  This study tests if this hypothesis holds.   
Finally, LOCKOUT is an independent variable that will only be included in the NHL 
regressions.  LOCKOUT has an unknown relationship with attendance in that a year 
following a lockout, fans will either be overjoyed to attend games and will attend games in 
large numbers or fans will be mad that a lockout occurred and will choose not to attend 
games in protest.     
Below is the model that includes factors which affect total league revenue during a 
recessionary period: 
REVENUE = f (GATE, ATT, PRICE, POP, INCOME, RECESS,   (2) 
UNEMPL, LOCKOUT)          
where Table 4 lists the variable names and definitions. 
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Table 4: Description of Revenue Variables 
REVENUE Total League Revenue per year (2012 U.S Dollars) 
GATE Total Gate Receipts per league per year (2012 U.S. Dollars) 
ATT Total League Attendance per year 
PRICE Average Ticket Price per game per season (2012 U.S. Dollars) 
POP Total National U.S. Population per year 
INCOME Real U.S. per capita income per year (2012 Dollars) 
RECESS NBER recession years – Percentage of months of a league’s season that 
occurred during a recession 
UNEMPL National U.S. Unemployment Rate per year 
LOCKOUT Dummy variable used to account for NHL lockout years of 1991-1992, 
1994-1995, 2004-2005.   1=year that followed a recession, 0=year that did 
not follow a recession 
 
Turning to REVENUE, for some of these variables, the relationship between them and 
total league revenue, ceteris paribus, is clear.  For others, the relationship is uncertain.  
Therefore, below is a brief description of the a priori relationships between REVENUE and 
its independent variables.  These are hypothesized relationships.   
GATE and ATT have a positive relationship with REVENUE.  The higher the total 
gate revenue, the higher the league’s revenue.  As for ATT, the greater the total number of 
people who attend a game, the higher the total league revenue.   
 The relationship between PRICE and REVENUE is unclear as it depends on price 
elasticity of demand.  For instance, as the price of a ticket goes up, if attendance remains the 
same because of a perfectly inelastic demand, total league revenue could also increase.  
However, if price increases so much so that potential fans do not attend games, then total 
league revenue will decrease because there are fewer people going to games.  Jacobs (2009) 
predicts and proves that ticket price has a positive relationship on NBA total revenues.  In 
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turn, the relationship between PRICE and REVENUE is dependent on the number of people 
who attend games.   
 The relationship of REVENUE with both POP and INCOME is positive.  Jacobs 
(2009) explains, “Population is very important to the ability of franchises to generate revenue 
because a higher population translates into a larger consumer base for a specific team”.  
Jacobs also finds that POP “proved to be extremely significant in the model, having a t-
statistic of 5.55”.  Similarly, people with a higher INCOME have the ability to spend more 
money attending professional sporting events.   
The relationship of REVENUE with both RECESS and UNEMPL, the recessionary 
variables, is unclear.  While intuition would indicate that total league revenue would decrease 
during a recession and when unemployment rates are high, this is exactly what this study 
wishes to further examine.  Because no previous studies explore the effects of RECESS and 
UNEMPL on REVENUE, the predictions for these relationships are uncertain.       
Finally, LOCKOUT is a variable that will only be included in the NHL regressions.  
LOCKOUT has an unknown relationship with REVENUE.  In the year following a lockout, 
fans will either be overjoyed to attend games and will spend money on the National Hockey 
League, thus increasing overall revenue, or fans will be mad that a lockout occurred and will 
choose not to attend games or spend money on the NHL in protest, thus hurting revenue.     
 
IV. Data 
The variables and data below used in both equation 1 and equation 2 deal with  
information ranging from 1990 to 2012 within the United States and account for only 
American teams in the National Hockey League, Major League Baseball, and National 
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Football League.4  As a reminder, all dollar values provided in this study have been adjusted 
for inflation and reflect real terms based on 2012 dollars.      
 In equation 1, ATTENDANCE refers to the total, overall league attendance per year 
for the NHL, MLB, and NFL, measured in units, as reported by ESPN (2013) and Fort 
(2012).  PRICE is the average ticket price, in 2012 dollars, per year for each of the three 
leagues.  The average ticket price for each league was compiled by Fort (2012) and Forbes 
Magazine (2013).   
 INCOME, measured in units, is the U.S. per capita income as recorded by the World 
Bank (2014) from 1990 to 2012 and converted into 2012 dollars.  POP is the total U.S. 
population for the years 1990-2012 in millions.  This data was provided by the United States 
Census Bureau (2012).   
 TEAMS refer to the total number of teams in a certain league for a given year, and 
this data was also recorded by the National Football League, National Hockey League, and 
Major League Baseball (2013, 2014).  For the NHL and MLB, Canadian teams were 
subtracted out of the total number of teams so as to solely focus on American teams.   
 SUBS refer to the average ticket prices, in 2012 U.S. dollars, of competing sports 
leagues.  For instance, MLB’s average ticket price will compete against the average ticket 
prices of the NFL and the NHL.  All average ticket prices were compiled by Fort (2012) and 
Forbes Magazine (2013).   
 RECESS and UNEMPL are the study’s recessionary variables.  RECESS is the 
percent of months that a certain league’s games occurred during a U.S. recession.  The 
                                                          
4
For Major League Baseball, the Montreal Expos were factored out of all variable data from the years 1990 to 
2004, and the Toronto Blue Jays were factored out of the data sets from 1990 to 2012.  For the National Hockey 
League, the Montreal Canadians, Ottawa Senators, Toronto Maple Leafs, Calgary Flames, Edmonton Oilers, 
and Vancouver Canucks were factored out of each category from 1990 to 2012.  The Quebec Nordiques existed 
from 1990-1994 so they were eliminated from all data sets, and the Winnipeg Jets were factored out from 1990-
1996 and then again from 1999-2012.  The reason for taking out the Canadian teams’ data is that this study aims 
to focus strictly on U.S. recessions and their impact on American based-teams.   
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recessionary period is defined by the National Bureau of Economic Research (2010).  
UNEMPL, a percentage, is the annual U.S. unemployment rate compiled by the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics (2014) taken from the July recordings.   
Finally, LOCKOUT is a variable that will only be included in the NHL regression, as 
the NHL is the only league with more than one lockout over the time span of 1990-2012.  
According to National Hockey League (2014), the 1992 lockout postponed thirty games, the 
1994-1995 lockout shortened the regular season to forty-eight games, and the 2004-2005 
lockout cancelled the entire season.  While the MLB cancelled its entire 1994-1995 season 
due to strike, this is only one strike as compared to the three within the NHL from 1990-
2012.  LOCKOUT refers to whether a season occurred after a lockout, and it is a dummy 
variable.  1 = a season that occurred after a lockout and 0 = a season that did not occur after a 
lockout.  Tables 5,6,7 contain summary statistics on the variables used in the attendance 
analysis.   
 
Table 5: Summary Statistics of Attendance Variables for NFL 
Variables Mean Standard Deviation 
ATTENDANCE 15,706,926 1,617,349.93 
PRICE  62.70 12.87 
INCOME 36,132.00 8,916.51 
POP 283,643,478 19,828,052.35 
TEAMS 30.52 1.62 
SUBS (NHL) 54.53 6.14 
SUBS (MLB) 21.66 5.00 
RECESS .13 .31 
UNEMPL 6.06 1.61 
Notes:  The average was taken for overall league attendance for the years 1992-1998 
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SUBS (NHL): ticket price for 1991 is the average of 1990 and 1992 ticket prices, in 2012 dollars =50.39, ticket price for 2004 is 
the average of 2003 and 2005 ticket prices, in 2012 dollars = 50.54, ticket price for 2012 is the average of 2013 (60.13) and 2011 
ticket prices = 55.63 (required to do this because missing these years due to lockout) 
SUBS (MLB): ticket price for 1994 is the average of 1993 and 1995 ticket prices, in 2012 dollars = 15.74 
 
Table 6: Summary Statistics of Attendance Variables for MLB 
Variables Mean Standard Deviation 
ATTENDANCE 65,343,910 9,201,632.98 
PRICE  21.93 4.94 
INCOME 36,566.29 8,873.88 
POP 384,577,273 19,770,250.18 
TEAMS 27 1.77 
SUBS (NHL) 54.54 6.29 
SUBS (NFL) 63.38 12.74 
RECESS  4.63 21.31 
UNEMPL 6.06 1.65 
Notes:  1994 season not included because of strike 
Average Ticket Price for 1990 is average of ticket price in 1988 (2012 U.S. dollars equals 11.94) and average ticket price of 1991 
SUBS (NHL): ticket price for 1991 is the average of 1990 and 1992 ticket prices, in 2012 dollars =50.39, ticket price for 2004 is 
the average of 2003 and 2005 ticket prices, in 2012 dollars = 50.54, ticket price for 2012 is the average of 2013 (60.13) and 2011 
ticket prices = 55.63 (required to do this because missing these years due to lockout)  
 
 
 
Table 7: Summary Statistics of Attendance Variables for NHL 
Variables Mean Standard Deviation 
ATTENDANCE 14,265,625 2,156,167.45 
PRICE  54.91  6.64 
INCOME  36,355.66 8,456.38 
POP 284,163,158 18,681,072.14 
TEAMS 21.71 2.00 
SUBS (NFL)  63.52 12.33 
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SUBS (MLB)  21.88 4.91 
RECESS .15 .32 
UNEMPL 5.99 1.74 
LOCKOUT .16 .37 
Notes: Seasons not included are 1991-1992, 1994-1995, 2004-2005, 2012-2013 because these are lockout years 
Total attendance for 1992-1993 comes from the average of total attendance for 1990-1991 and 1993-1994 
Average ticket price for the year 1990-1991 is the average of the average ticket price of 1989-1990 (42.49) and the average ticket 
price of 1995-1996, the average ticket price for 1991-1992 is the average of the average ticket price of 1990-1991 and 1995-
1996, the average ticket price of 1992-1993 is the average of the average ticket price of 1991-1992 and 1995-1996, the average 
ticket price of 1993-1994 is the average of the average ticket price of 1992-1993 and 1995-1996, and the average ticket price of 
1994-1995 is the average of the average ticket price of 1993-1994 and the average ticket price of 1995-1996 
 
 In equation 2, REVENUE, measured in 2012 U.S dollars, refers to the total league 
revenue per year, adding up each teams’ individual revenues, for each of the three leagues.  
This information was gathered by Forbes Magazine (2013) and Fort (2012).  GATE refers to 
the total gate revenue for a given year for a given league, measured in U.S. 2012 dollars as 
reported by Fort (2012).  ATT is the total attendance per league per year, measured in units, 
and this information was recorded by ESPN (2013) and Fort (2012).  PRICE refers to the 
average ticket price per year per league, in 2012 U.S. dollars, and this information was 
gathered by Fort (2012).   
 POP, recorded in units, is the total national U.S. population for the years 1990-2012.  
This data was provided by the U.S. Census Bureau (2012).  INCOME is the U.S. annual per 
capita income, measured in 2012 dollars, as recorded by the World Bank (2014).   
Lastly, RECESS and UNEMPL are recessionary variables.  RECESS is the 
percentage of months per season in which games were played during a recession.  The 
recessionary years are defined by the National Bureau of Economic Research (2010).  
Unemployment figures reflect the U.S. unemployment rate compiled by the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics (2014) taken from the July recordings. 
Finally, LOCKOUT is a variable that will only be included in the NHL regressions, as 
the NHL is the only league with more than one lockout over the time span of 1990-2012.  
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LOCKOUT refers to whether a season occurred after a lockout, and it is a dummy variable.  1 
= a season that occurred after a lockout and 0 = a season that did not occur after a lockout.  
Tables 8,9,10 contain summary statistics on the variables used in this analysis.  
 
Table 8: Summary Statistics of Revenue Variables NFL 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation 
REVENUE 5,657,748,348 2,403,946,465 
GATE 1,305,044,728 468,178,490 
ATT 15,706,926 1,617,349.93 
PRICE 62.70 12.87 
POP 283,643,478 19,828,052.35 
INCOME 36,132 8,916.51 
RECESS .13 .31 
UNEMPL 6.06 1.61 
Notes:  The average was taken for overall league attendance for the years 1992-1998 
For 1997 league revenue, the average of league revenue of 1996 and 1998 was used 
Total gate receipts of 1997 came from the average of total gate receipts of 1996 and 1999, total gate receipts for 1998 was taken 
from the average of total gate receipts of 1997 and 1999, total gate receipts for 2000 was taken from the average of total gate 
receipts of 1999 and 2002, and total gate receipts for 2001 was taken from average of total gate receipts of 2000 and 2002, and 
total gate receipts for 2012 is the same as 2011 
 
Table 9: Summary Statistics of Revenue Variables MLB 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation 
REVENUE 4,313,440,797 15,511,196,500 
GATE 1,670,130,282 756,729,349.7 
ATT 62,902,941 9,201,632.98 
PRICE  21.93 4.94 
POP 284,577,273 19,770,250.18 
INCOME 36,566.29 8,873.88 
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RECESS 4.63 21.30 
UNEMPL 6.06 1.65 
Notes:  1994 season not included in data because of strike 
Average Ticket Price for 1990 is average of ticket price in 1988 (2012 U.S. dollars equals 11.94) and average ticket price of 1991 
Total Revenue for 1998 is the average of 1997 and 1999 
Total Gate Receipts for 1997 is the average of 1996 and 1999 gate receipts and the Total Gate Receipts for 1998 is the average of 
1997 and 1999 gate receipts 
 
 
 
Table 10: Summary Statistics of Revenue Variables NHL 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation 
REVENUE 2,018,731,492 1,026,686,878 
GATE  809,176,231.5 158,414,598.6 
ATT 14,265,625 2,156,167.45 
PRICE  54.91 6.64 
POP 284,263,158 18,681,072.14 
INCOME 36,355.66 8,456.38 
RECESS .15 .32 
UNEMPL 5.98 1.74 
LOCKOUT .16 .37 
Note:  1991-1992, 1994-1995, 2004-2005, 2012-2013 seasons are not included in data because lockout years 
Total attendance for 1992-1993 came from the average of total attendance for 1990-1991 and 1993-1994 
Average ticket price for the year 1990-1991 is the average of the average ticket price of 1989-1990 (42.49) and the average ticket 
price of 1995-1996, the average ticket price for 1991-1992 is the average of the average ticket price of 1990-1991 and 1995-
1996, the average ticket price of 1992-1993 is the average of the average ticket price of 1991-1992 and 1995-1996, the average 
ticket price of 1993-1994 is the average of the average ticket price of 1992-1993 and 1995-1996, and the average ticket price of 
1994-1995 is the average of the average ticket price of 1993-1994 and the average ticket price of 1995-1996 
Total gate receipts for 1996-1997 is the average of 1995 -1996 and 1999-2000 total gate receipts, total gate receipts for 1997-
1998 is the average of 1996-1997 and 1999-2000 total gate receipts, total gate receipts for 1998-1999 is the average of 1997-1998 
and 1999-2000 total gate receipts, total gate receipts for 2000-2001 is the average of 1999-2000 and 2002-2003 total gate 
receipts, and total gate receipts for 2001-2002 is the average of 2000-2001 and 2002-2003 total gate receipts 
 
 
 
V. Estimation Results 
 
This section presents the results from the six regressions that were run.  Two separate   
models (ATTENDANCE and REVENUE) were run three times each for each of the leagues 
(NFL, NHL, MLB) to see which variables have a significant effect on ATTENDANCE and 
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REVENUE.  Based on the results, one can decide if these three leagues are recession proof.  
While all variables are important in explaining what factors influence ATTENDANCE and 
REVENUE in these leagues, this analysis will pay particular attention to RECESS and 
UNEMPL and their relationship to these dependent variables.  Through UNEMPL and 
RECESS, this study will decide if each of these leagues are recession proof.  The first 
recessionary variable, UNEMPL, ignoring any possible lags, tends to increase during a 
recession.  For example, before the 1991 recession, the unemployment rate in 1990 was 5.5% 
and, in 1991, the unemployment rate rose to 6.8%.  In 2006, the unemployment rate was 
4.7%, and by 2009, it had reached 9.5% (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2014).  Table 11 shows 
the results for the three regressions run on the ATTENDANCE model for each of the three 
leagues.  The first number in the row is a variable’s estimated coefficient, and the number in 
parentheses is the coefficient’s t-statistic.  The F statistic, the number of observations, R2, and 
the adjusted R2 are provided at the bottom of each table.   
 
Table 11: Regression Estimates of Dependent Variable Attendance in NFL, NHL, MLB 
 
 
Independent Variable Expected 
Sign 
Regression 1 
(NFL) 
Regression 2 
(MLB) 
Regression 3 
(NHL) 
Intercept 
? 
19920222.33 
(1.256) 
250812274.6bb 
(2.487) 
-70863905.32 
(-1.659) 
PRICE 
_ 
-34594.53 
(-0.457) 
1396424.791 
(1.398) 
15026.598 
(0.090) 
INCOME 
? 
188.811 
(0.967) 
4184.916bb 
(1.132) 
-461.107 
(-0.809) 
POP 
+ 
-0.101 
(-0.957) 
-1.966 
(-3.132) 
0.365a 
(1.585) 
TEAMS 
+ 
387049.908aa 
(1.78) 
6662994.679aa 
(3.691) 
242015.866 
(0.624) 
SUBS 
+ 
MLB 
362226.591aa 
(3.228) 
NHL 
653367.724aa 
(2.077) 
NFL 
-82301.878 
(-0.239) 
SUBS + NHL NFL MLB 
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20624.553 
(0.483) 
-622568.52 
(-0.972) 
-45138.742 
(-0.108) 
RECESS 
_ 
-600429.280a 
(-1.676) 
10751.798 
(0.294) 
223108.845 
(0.186) 
UNEMPL 
_ 
-141823.285 
(-1.14) 
1826975.088 
(1.923) 
-305634.483 
(-0.939) 
LOCKOUT 
? 
  517728.203 
(0.643) 
F-statistic 
N 
R
2
 
Adjusted R
2
 
 
 
 
53.480 
23 
.968 
.950 
19.716 
22 
.924 
.877 
9.111 
19 
.901 
.802 
 
a significant at .10 level (one tail test)   b significant at .10 level (two tail test) 
aa significant at . 05 level (one tail test)    bb significant at .05 (two tail test) 
 
 
ATTENDANCE  
Regression 1:  
This regression examined the results of 8 independent variables against the dependent  
variable of NFL ATTENDANCE.  Two of these variables proved to be significant in 
affecting NFL ATTENDANCE.  The two significant variables at a significance level of .05 
were SUBS (MLB) and TEAMS.  One variable that was not significant but proved to be 
interesting was RECESS.  The regression, as a whole, was extremely significant with an R2 of 
0.968 and a very high F statistic of 53.480 compared to a low Significance F of 3.537E-09.  
According to this regression, 96.8% of the variation in ATTENDANCE can be explained by 
the independent variables.  This regression includes 23 observations.   
 SUBS (MLB) was hypothesized to positively affect NFL ATTENDANCE, and the 
hypothesis failed to be rejected.  As MLB ticket prices increase, more people will attend NFL 
games.  This also implies that the NFL is a closer substitute to the MLB than the NHL.  
SUBS (NHL) positively related to ATTENDANCE, as predicted, but was not significant.  
This is not surprising in that hockey is a more regional sport than football and baseball which 
are popular across the U.S.  Noll (2001, p.200) elaborates, “The long hockey tradition in 
eastern Canada is obviously reflected in attendance figures for that area, and the spread of 
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hockey’s popularity has been more rapid and complete in regions where winter weather 
permits hockey to be played more extensively”.   
 TEAMS was also hypothesized to positively affect NFL ATTENDANCE, and this 
hypothesis failed to be rejected.  TEAMS had a p-value of .0484.  As predicted, the more 
teams in the league, the higher the attendance.  RECESS, although not significant, was very 
close to being significant with a p-value of .05799.  This result indicates that NFL games 
played during a recession negatively impact NFL ATTENDANCE.  Because RECESS, a 
recessionary variable, was nearly significant, this implies that the NFL ATTENDANCE may 
be affected by recessions.  Greg McFarlane (2011) explains, “The NFL’s immunity to 
economic hardship is a classic example of how wonderful it is when a third party picks up the 
tab.  It starts with the NFL’s own acknowledgment that 95% of fans never attend a game”.  
He argues that the NFL remains recession proof because of TV revenues as the NFL “goes 
out of its way to accommodate you.  There are multiple camera angles, replays and instant 
access to scoring drives on the Red Zone Channel, which is better than life itself.  All you 
have to do is keep your eyes glued to the screen”.  Leeds (2006, p.521) further elaborates that 
TV is “the lifeblood of the NFL . . . A significant decline in TV revenue could cause several 
teams to sustain operating losses”.  Finally, McFarlane and Leeds argue that the NFL remains 
recession proof partly through the league’s ability to accommodate fans at home through 
television outlets.  However, because RECESS is nearly significant, this highlights how 
RECESS hurts fan attendance.       
 The rest of the variables proved to be insignificant.  This can be attributed to the issue 
of multicollinearity in which some of the variables included in the regression overlap one 
another causing certain variables to be insignificant; Table 13 in the Appendix provides the 
correlation matrix for NFL ATTENDANCE.  When running a separate regression, in an 
effort to account for multicollinearity, when PRICE was eliminated, RECESS, SUBS (MLB), 
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and TEAMS were all significant at the .05 level.  RECESS was significant with a p-value of 
.02695.  According to these results, when average ticket price was eliminated, the number of 
months the NFL holds games during a recession significantly and negatively affects 
ATTENDANCE as proven by the coefficient of -666663.577.  In having this variable affect 
ATTENDANCE negatively, even with television revenue, this highlights how the NFL is not 
completely recession proof as overall attendance is negatively impacted during a recession.  
For example, according to the ESPN (2013), in 2006, overall NFL attendance was 17,509,509 
and, in 2008, attendance decreased to 16,190,099 which displays how the NFL suffered 
attendance loss during the most recent recession.   
Turning back to the initial regression which did not consider multicollinearity, 
ATTENDANCE was not significantly impacted by any other variables except SUBS (MLB) 
and TEAMS.  PRICE negatively affected ATTENDANCE, as predicted, but was not 
significant; INCOME was positively related to ATTENDANCE but was also not significant.  
POP, which was predicted to positively affect overall attendance, appeared negatively related 
to ATTENDANCE but was also insignificant.  One reason that POP may not be related to 
ATTENDANCE is because POP is highly correlated with other variables such as INCOME, 
TEAMS, and SUBS (MLB).   
Finally, UNEMPL was not significant but negatively related to ATTENDANCE as 
predicted.  This means that as the unemployment rate increases, ATTENDANCE decreases.  
However, UNEMPL should not be considered when deciding if NFL ATTENDANCE is 
recession proof because it was not significant.  In contrast, although not fully significant in 
the first regression, when collinearity was considered, RECESS was significant.  This 
indicates that NFL ATTENDANCE may not be recession proof as one of the two 
recessionary variables proved to be significant and negatively related to ATTENDANCE.    
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Regression 2: 
 The second regression, under the ATTENDANCE model, included 8 variables against 
the dependent variable of MLB ATTENDANCE.  Three of the variables were significant in 
this regression, and two variables, although not significant, provided interesting results.  The 
three variables that were significant at the .05 level include TEAMS, INCOME, and SUBS 
(NHL).  The variables which were not significant but are interesting to explore include 
UNEMPL and POP.  This regression had an R2 of 0.924 which means that 92.4% of the 
variation in MLB ATTENDANCE is explained by the independent variables.  This 
regression also had 22 observations as the 1994 data, due to a strike, was eliminated.  
 TEAMS was hypothesized to positively affect overall attendance as the more teams in 
the MLB, the more opportunity people have to attend games.  The results failed to reject the 
hypothesis as the p-value of .001336 proved to be positively significant with 
ATTENDANCE.  As noted earlier, this relationship is not surprising as Major League 
Baseball increased the number of teams from 24 teams in 1970 to the current number of 30 
teams (Major League Baseball, 2013).  INCOME, which had an indeterminate hypothesized 
relationship, positively affected ATTENDANCE with a p-value of 0.0079 and a coefficient 
of 4184.916448.  This is a surprising result in that Noll (2001, p.171) finds a very different 
relationship between ATT and INCOME.  He explains, “Given the negative correlation 
between attendance and income, baseball appears to be a working class sport”.  While Noll 
(2001, p.190) argues that baseball is more “successful in cities with lower average income,” 
that is not necessarily true as, today, there are ranges of seat options.  People with higher 
incomes can sit in box seats or club seats whereas people with lower incomes can sit in 
regular seating or in the grand stand which are cheaper seats.  Therefore, INCOME should 
not negatively impact ATTENDANCE, arguably, because there are ranges of seating prices 
that accommodate any level of income. 
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Lastly, the hypothesized relationship between SUB (NHL) was positive because as 
NHL ticket prices increase, the number of people attending MLB games will increase.  The 
results indicate a significantly positive relationship between SUBS (NHL) and 
ATTENDANCE with a p-value of 0.0291.  While these results contradict the earlier findings 
in Regression 1, which showed that NFL ATTENDANCE and MLB (SUBS) had a 
significant relationship, one possible reason for why SUBS (NHL) is significant and not 
SUBS (NFL), within this regression, is that the NHL and MLB seasons overlap with one 
another for more months of the year.  While MLB typically runs from April to late October, 
the NHL (October until June) overlaps with the MLB four months of the year while the NFL 
(September to February) overlaps with MLB only in the months of September and October.  
POP, hypothesized to have a positive relationship with ATTENDANCE, was not 
significant in the appropriate one-tail test, even with a p-value of .00395, because it has an 
unexpected negative coefficient of -1.966.  This is extremely interesting in that, typically, the 
higher the population, the greater the demand to attend games.  One way to justify this 
inverse relationship, despite it being insignificant, is that even with an increasing population 
in a given city, this does not necessarily mean that the increased population contains MLB 
fans.   
 One variable which was not significant but is interesting to explore further is 
UNEMPL.  Intuition finds that the higher the unemployment rate, the lower the number of 
people who attend MLB games.  Within this study, the unemployment rate had an unexpected 
positive coefficient with a t-statistic of 1.923, thus it also was not significant.  Many 
economists argue that the MLB is recession proof, as shown by neither RECESS nor 
UNEMPL being significant, because MLB finds ways to get its fans to attend games even 
during economic downturns.  Klayman (2008) explains than in the 2007-2009 recession, the 
San Francisco Giants offered, “. . . a $25 gas card through August when fans buy four game 
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tickets online for $75”.  He also comments, “Baseball was there during the Depression, 
during World War II, as an element of the country's recovery from 9/11, and will continue to 
be available at affordable prices”.  Lastly, Klayman cites Andrew Zimbalist as saying, “The 
evidence of past recession is indeed that sports is one of the last things that people cut back 
on . . . They need their distractions and they need their obsessions”.  Similarly, the fact that 
UNEMPL was positively related to ATTENDANCE also highlights how individuals still 
attend games even with high unemployment rates; this will be discussed further in the 
analysis of Regression 4.  RECESS, although not significant, was positively related to 
ATTENDANCE; this simply highlights how individuals still managed to attend games even 
during a recession.  Therefore, MLB ATTENDANCE, based on the non-significant positive 
results of RECESS and UNEMPL, appears to be recession-proof.   
Finally, the remaining two variables of SUBS (NFL) and PRICE were both 
insignificant and do not heavily influence ATTENDANCE.  Despite PRICE not being 
significant, it is also interesting to explore.  Over the three recessions, average real ticket 
prices generally increased slightly from $13.53 in 1990 to $15.12 in 1991, $22.75 in 2000 to 
$23.36 in 2001, and $25.24 in 2006 to $28.79 in 2009.  While PRICE generally increased 
during a recession, this did not prevent people from attending MLB games as PRICE proved 
to be insignificant in relation to ATTENDANCE; teams found that they could increase 
PRICE to maintain revenue because fans would still attend games during a recession.  Further 
evidence of this is found in Regression 5 in which PRICE is positively related to MLB 
REVENUE.   
 
Regression 3: 
Within this regression, 9 variables were examined against NHL ATTENDANCE.   
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The regression’s R2 was 0.901 and its F-statistic was 9.111.  This means that 90.1% of the 
variation in NHL ATTENDANCE can be explained by the independent variables.  Despite 
this, none of the independent variables proved to be significant at the .05 level when 
individually examined against NHL ATTENDANCE.  There are several possible 
explanations for this.  The first explanation may be that within the data set ranging from 
1990-2012, there were four lockouts.  These years were eliminated from the regression which 
means there were four less data sets to work with than the NFL and three less than MLB 
(1991-1992, 1994-1995, 2004-2005, 2012-2013).   
The second possible explanation is the issue of multicollinearity; the Appendix 
provides the correlation matrix for NHL ATTENDANCE in Table 14.  When running a 
second regression to consider collinearity, PRICE and TEAMS were eliminated.  As a result, 
two variables were significant.  One was POP and the other was UNEMPL.  The predicted 
relationship between NHL attendance and POP was that the higher the population, the more 
fans attend NHL games.  With a p-value of .0286 and a positive coefficient, this regression 
failed to reject the hypothesis.  Moreover, the hypothesized relationship between UNEMPL 
and ATTENDANCE was negative in that the higher the unemployment rate, the lower the 
overall NHL attendance.  The regression results failed to reject this hypothesis with a p-value 
of 0.00725.  Therefore, without PRICE and TEAMS, NHL ATTENDANCE shows signs of 
not being recession proof because it was affected by UNEMPL; the greater the UNEMPL, the 
lower the ATTENDANCE.  
 Returning back to the original regression, the third possible reason that none of the 
variables proved individually significant is that seven of the of the twenty-three NHL teams 
are Canadian.  Because the NHL is so regionally based and is extremely popular in Canada, 
excluding Canadian teams’ data may have skewed attendance figures.  For instance, in 2012, 
NHL total attendance was 21,470,155 (Fort, 2012).  Canadian attendance made up 5,941,424 
28 
 
of that 21,471,155 which is approximately 27.67% of overall attendance.  This is a fairly high 
percentage and may account for the large number of insignificant variables.     
 Koba (2013) argues, “Only hockey among the four major pro sports was able to have 
greater attendance now than before the Great Recession”.  He finds that this is the case 
because “Hockey fans are also more affluent than in other sports . . . the NHL can jack up the 
ticket prices more than other sports and still keeps its fans”.  Lastly Koba calculates hockey 
fans average per capita household income at approximately $104,000 compared to MLB fans 
at $96,000 and $94,500 for NFL fans; this is measured in 2013 U.S. dollars.  However, 
Koba’s argument is difficult to accept because in both regressions, the first one and the 
second one (when considering collinearity), INCOME was not significant which highlights 
how an individual’s INCOME does not affect his/her NHL ATTENDANCE.5  Therefore, this 
finding disproves Koba’s assertion that income matters and causes this study to return to the 
second NHL regression which considers collinearity.  When collinearity is considered, which 
appears to be the stronger argument for the high number of insignificant variables, UNEMPL 
is significant.  This implies that the NHL may not be recession proof as the higher the 
unemployment rate, the lower the ATTENDANCE.  Finally, turning to the other variables 
considered in the original regression, LOCKOUT, POP, SUBS (NFL), SUBS (MLB), and 
TEAMS were all insignificant  
 Table 12 provides the results for the second regression run based on REVENUE for 
NFL, MLB, and NHL.  The first number in the row is a variable’s estimated coefficient, and 
the number in parentheses is the coefficient’s t-statistic.  The F statistic, the number of 
observations, R2, and the adjusted R2 are provided at the bottom of each table.   
 
 
                                                          
5 It is important to note that, as seen in Table 14, INCOME is highly correlated with other variables such as 
ATT, POP, SUBS (NFL), and SUBS (NHL).   
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Table 12: Regression Estimates of Dependent Variable Revenue in NFL, NHL, MLB 
 
Independent Variable Expected 
Sign 
Regression 4 
(NFL) 
Regression 5 
(MLB) 
Regression 6 
(NHL) 
Intercept 
? 
-9498870120 
(-1.268) 
8618129521bb 
(3.397) 
52016293632 
(0.863) 
GATE 
+ 
1.741aa 
(2.481) 
0.089a 
(1.528) 
5.621 
(1.079) 
ATT 
+ 
222.261aa 
(2.016) 
24.801aa 
(3.708) 
-250.014 
(-0.800) 
PRICE 
? 
-22721762.33 
(-1.099) 
98418001.66bb 
(3.676) 
118278957.4 
(1.360) 
POP 
+ 
19.201 
(0.567) 
-58.875 
(-4.724) 
-306.209 
(-0.932) 
INCOME 
+ 
123587.895aa 
(2.567) 
218518.824aa 
(9.212) 
750035.035 
(1.099) 
RECESS 
? 
92614736.05 
(0.446) 
-1833944.672 
(-1.463) 
-1135221133 
(-1.066) 
UNEMPL 
? 
147576016.3bb 
(4.968) 
89178194.73bb 
(4.862) 
413581748.5 
(1.233) 
LOCKOUT 
? 
  -6835045.303 
(-0.011) 
F-statistic 
N 
R
2
 
Adjusted R
2
 
 
 
 
703.105 
23 
.997 
.996 
561.281 
22 
.996 
.995 
2.575 
19 
0.673 
0.412 
 
a significant at .10 level (one tail test)   b significant at .10 level (two tail test) 
aa significant at . 05 level (one tail test)    bb significant at .05 (two tail test) 
A. REVENUE 
Regression 4: 
The fourth regression included 7 independent variables examined against NFL  
REVENUE.  Overall, the regression had a high R2 of 0.997 and F statistic of 703.105.  This 
means that 99.7% of the variation in NFL REVENUE can be explained by the independent 
variables.  Four of the variables proved to be significant at the .05 level of significance and 
those include GATE, ATT, INCOME, and UNEMPL.   This regression included 23 
observations.   
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 GATE was predicted to have a positive relationship with REVENUE, and the 
hypothesis failed to be rejected.  With a p-value of 0.0127 and a coefficient of 1.741, the 
higher the GATE, the greater the NFL REVENUE.  These results coincide with ATT in that 
the higher the ATT, typically, the greater the GATE and thus the higher the REVENUE.  
ATT was also positively significant with a p-value of 0.031.  Therefore, the higher the ATT, 
the greater the NFL REVENUE.   
 The next variable that was significant was INCOME with a p-value of 0.0107.  
INCOME was predicated to positively affect REVENUE, and this hypothesis failed to be 
rejected.  Therefore, a person with a higher INCOME has the ability to spend more money on 
the National Football League.  The last significant variable was UNEMPL with the p-value of 
0.0001.  Intuition argues that the higher the UNEMPL, fewer people attend games or are less 
inclined to spend money on the NFL which lowers REVENUE.  The results reveal that 
UNEMPL was positively related to REVENUE.  According to the positive coefficient of 
147576016.3, as UNEMPL increases, so too does REVENUE.  The first possible explanation 
for this is that even though those who are unemployed cannot or do not attend games during a 
recession, those who are wealthy or middle class choose to attend NFL games and spend 
money on the NFL.  This contradicts Noll’s (2001, p.194) argument when he asserts, 
“Football attendance, like baseball, is negatively associated with income”.  Noll neglects to 
consider that REVENUE remains high because the middle class and wealthy continue to 
spend money on the NFL.  Differently, another reason UNEMPL may be positively related to 
REVENUE is that even the unemployed, who are on a fixed income, need sports as a release 
from every day stresses.  Klayman (2008) finds that “Sports are a great distraction from the 
economy”.  Klayman, in his article, interviewed a fan who was laid off during the 2007-2009 
recession, and the fan commented that he still attended sporting events saying, “. . . it kind of 
perks me up, at least for a minute anyway”.  Therefore, even those who are unemployed opt 
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to spend money and attend, as indicated by the significant ATT variable of .0310, NFL 
games.  Finally, under both possible explanations, the fact that UNEMPL and REVENUE are 
positively related indicates that NFL REVENUE may be recession proof.   
 Three variables that proved insignificant in relation to REVENUE were PRICE, POP, 
and RECESS.  PRICE, with a p-value of 0.289, was negatively related to REVENUE.  POP, 
with a p-value of 0.290, was positively related to REVENUE, as predicted, because as POP 
rises, REVENUE is expected to rise as well.  Lastly, RECESS, insignificant with a p-value of 
0.662, highlights how a recession has little to no effect on NFL REVENUE.  Despite being 
insignificant, RECESS was positively related to REVENUE which means REVENUE still 
increases during a recession.  In conclusion, with a positive RECESS variable, although not 
significant, and a positive UNEMPL variable, which was significant, NFL REVENUE 
appears recession proof.    
 
Regression 5: 
The fifth regression tested seven variables against MLB REVENUE.  The regression 
produced an R2 of 0.996 and a high F statistic of 561.281.  This means that 99.6% of the 
variation in MLB REVENUE can be explained by the independent variables.  Four of these 
variables proved significant at the .05 level and those include ATT, PRICE, INCOME, and 
UNEMPL.  RECESS and GATE, although not significant, are interesting to explore further.  
There were 22 observations in this regression. 
Firstly, ATT was predicted to positively affect REVENUE and, with a p-value of 
0.00117, the hypothesis failed to be rejected.  This means that as ATT goes up, so too does 
MLB REVENUE.  Likewise, INCOME was expected to positively impact REVENUE, and 
this also proved true.  With a positive p-value of 1.28E-07, the higher the INCOME, the more 
people will opt to spend money on Major League Baseball.   
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PRICE was positively significant with a p-value of 0.002.  This means that as PRICE 
increases, so too does REVENUE.  During the most recent recession, MLB PRICE rose from 
$25.21 in 2007 to $28.23 in 2009.  While this is only a slight increase in PRICE, it was 
enough to accumulate some additional MLB REVENUE.   
 The final significant variable was UNEMPL with a p-value of 0.000252 and with a 
positive relationship to REVENUE.  This positive relationship to REVENUE is similar to 
NFL REVENUE’s relationship to UNEMPL.  There are several reasons for this positive 
relationship.  The first explanation directly contradicts Noll’s (2001) argument that baseball 
is a “working class sport”.  This coincides with the discovered positive relationship between 
MLB REVENUE and INCOME.  While Noll finds that baseball is a “working class sport” 
because he discovered a negative correlation between income and MLB attendance, this 
study found a positive relationship between MLB REVENUE and INCOME which counters 
Noll’s argument.  Those who attend games during an economic downturn may be middle 
class or wealthy individuals who can afford to spend money on Major League Baseball.  
Similarly, several MLB teams opened new stadiums during the 2007-2009 recession.  Those 
teams include the Yankees, whose new stadium opened April 2009, and the Mets who also 
opened a new stadium in 2009.  These franchises were able to charge premium prices for 
certain tickets in these new stadiums.  Those who could pay for these premium tickets were 
more willing to do so because they wished to see these new, state of the art stadiums.  
Therefore, despite UNEMPL increasing and the possibility of the unemployed not being able 
to attend games, those who can afford to go to games will choose to go.   
The second reason that UNEMPL and REVENUE may be positively related is 
because those who are unemployed still opt to attend MLB games and spend money on MLB; 
this is the same reasoning as NFL REVENUE in relation to UNEMPL.  Klayman (2008) 
interviewed a Chicago Cubs fan, recently laid off from work, and the man explained, “The 
33 
 
tickets cost a lot, but that’s what you have savings for, for special events”.  Therefore, even 
those who are unemployed find value and desire to spend their money on Major League 
Baseball.   
 Two variables which proved to be insignificant include RECESS, with a p-value of 
0.166, and GATE, with a p-value of 0.07.  RECESS was negatively related to REVENUE, 
and GATE was positively related to REVENUE.  In RECESS not being significant, one can 
assume that a recession does not influence MLB REVENUE.  This indicates that the MLB 
may be recession proof as RECESS does not influence MLB REVENUE and UNEMPL is 
positively related.  Lastly, GATE was positively related to REVENUE, as expected, but it 
was not significant.  One reason that GATE may not be significant is that ATT and GATE 
have a high collinearity of .78 which means that because ATT was significant, it prevented 
GATE from also factoring into REVENUE.   
Surprisingly and counter to the prediction, POP was negatively related to REVENUE 
but was also not significant.  It was not significant in the appropriate one-tail test since it had 
an unexpected negative sign in relation to REVENUE.   
 In conclusion, in UNEMPL being positively, significantly related to MLB REVENUE 
and RECESS not being significantly related, this implies that MLB REVENUE may be 
recession-proof as REVENUE shows signs of growth even during a recession.  
 
Regression 6: 
The final regression explored 8 variables and their effects on NHL REVENUE.  
Overall, the regression had an R2 of 0.673 and F statistics of 2.575.  This means that 67.3% of 
the variation in NHL REVENUE was explained by these 8 variables.  None of the variables 
proved to be significant individually at the .05 level of significance.  The main explanation 
for this is the issue of multicollinearity; the correlation matrix for NHL REVENUE is Figure 
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15 of the Appendix.  When considering collinearity and eliminating POP, INCOME was 
significant with a p-value of 0.04878.  This indicates that as INCOME increases so too does 
NHL REVENUE as more people will invest in the National Hockey League when they have 
a higher income.   
Other reasons why the variables failed to be significant are similar to those mentioned 
in Regression 3 concerning NHL ATTENDANCE.  Primarily, this regression only contained 
19 observations because four years of data were eliminated due to lockouts.  Another reason 
is that Canadian teams’ statistics were eliminated from the data sets.  Because hockey is so 
regionally based and 7 out of the 23 NHL teams are based in Canada, as discussed 
previously, eliminating Canadian teams may have hurt the regression results.  According to 
Forbes (2012), in the 2011-2012 season, the 7 Canadians NHL teams combined to make up 
$774 million dollars in revenue out of the $5.6 billion made in the season for the entire 
league.  Also, when it comes to total revenue per team for the 2011-2012 season, three 
Canadian NHL teams were ranked in the top ten for highest team revenues for the season.  
The Toronto Maple Leafs came in first place with revenue at $200 million, the Montreal 
Canadians came in third place with revenue at $169 million, and the Vancouver Canucks 
came in seventh place with revenue at $143 million.  It is clear, through revenue figures, that 
excluding the Canadian teams may have disrupted the accuracy of the NHL regression 
results.   
Moreover, it is important to explore the relationship between REVENUE and its 
insignificant variables.  GATE was positively related to REVENUE as predicted, but ATT 
was negatively related to REVENUE which counters the hypothesis.  PRICE, despite being 
insignificant, was positively related to REVENUE.  POP was negatively related to 
REVENUE, and, as seen in the previous regressions, despite POP increasing, it does not 
necessarily mean that it contains NHL fans.  As predicted, INCOME was positively but 
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insignificantly related to REVENUE.  LOCKOUT, which was only included in the NHL 
regressions, proved to be insignificant, but negatively related to REVENUE.  This indicates 
that REVENUE tends to be lower following a LOCKOUT. 
Lastly, the two recessionary variables of UNEMPL and RECESS were insignificant.  
UNEMPL, if it was significant, would positively affect REVENUE.  This, like with NFL and 
MLB REVENUE, explains that fans will continue to spend money on the NHL even when 
they are unemployed or wealthy/middle class attendance and support makes up for the 
unemployed people who are no longer able to attend games or spend money on the NHL.  
RECESS would be negatively related to REVENUE, if it was significant, which means that 
NHL REVENUE would decrease during a recessionary period.  Because both RECESS and 
UNEMPL do not strongly affect NHL REVENUE, there is not enough evidence, and the 
results are not strong enough to dub the NHL recession proof.   
 
VI. Conclusion: 
The goal of this study was to determine whether the NFL, MLB, and NHL were  
recession proof based on the results of the recessionary variables’ (UNEMPL and RECESS) 
impact on the dependent variables of ATTENDANCE and REVENUE.  As defined in the 
introduction, for the purpose of this study, a recession proof league reflects any league which 
continues to show growth, even if this growth slowed, in its ATTENDANCE and REVENUE 
figures.  ATTENDANCE and REVENUE are two indicators that define a successful league 
versus an unsuccessful league as a team with higher overall attendance and higher total 
revenue is more successful than one that is stagnant in these categories.  While focusing on 
whether these leagues were recession proof, this study also created a model which included 
other, non-recessionary factors which affect ATTENDANCE and REVENUE.  These 
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variables were included in order to see what affects annual league attendance and revenue 
within or not within a recession.   
 It can be concluded that one league appears to be recession proof, another is partially 
recession proof, and another does not have strong enough results to prove it is recession 
proof.  Foremost, the only league which proved to be completely recession proof is Major 
League Baseball.  This is because people still attend games and spend money on Major 
League Baseball even with high unemployment rates.  Support for this conclusion is further 
provided by concrete data.  In 2006, MLB overall attendance was 73,776,554 and, by 2008, 
attendance was 76,191,330 (ESPN, 2013).  Growth also occurred in MLB REVENUE in that 
REVENUE, in 2006, was 5,641,908,115, and by 2008, it was 6,021,826,532.   
 The NFL shows signs of being recession proof but is not completely unaffected by 
economic downturn.  NFL ATTENDANCE is not recession proof as RECESS impacted 
ATTENDANCE negatively.  Concrete data to support this can be seen as NFL overall 
attendance in 2006 was 17,606,057 and decreased by 2008 to 16,190,099.  The NFL 
recovered since the 2007-2009 recession with 2012 figures at 17,178,573.  Differently, NFL 
REVENUE shows signs of being recession proof.  In UNEMPL being positively significant 
against REVENUE, fans opt to spend money on the National Football League even when 
there is higher unemployment.  In 2006, NFL REVENUE was 7,466,999,000 and grew to 
8,077,799,000 by 2008.  This underscores how REVENUE remains generally unaffected by 
economic downturns.  Finally, one cannot assert that the NFL is completely recession proof 
as attendance decreases and fails to grow during an economic downturn.  However, the NFL 
is not completely hurt economically during a recession because the league is able to grow in 
its REVENUE sector.  Therefore, the NFL is partially recession proof. 
The NHL is not recession proof for several reasons.  Foremost, because UNEMPL 
was negatively significant when collinearity was considered, it is impossible to argue that 
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NHL ATTENDANCE is recession proof.  In 2008, NHL overall attendance was 16,209,885.  
By the 2009 season, ATTENDANCE decreased to 15,686,771.  These numbers highlight 
how NHL ATTENDANCE cannot be recession proof.  The NHL has seen a slight recovery, 
since the 2007-2009 recession, in that 2012 ATTENDANCE increased to 16,133,902.  
Moreover, NHL REVENUE is also not recession proof as neither UNEMPL nor RECESS 
significantly affected REVENUE; in both recessionary variables not being significant, one 
cannot boldly assert that NHL REVENUE is recession proof.  There is not enough evidence 
to make such an assertion.   
 Other non-recessionary variables proved to be significant when testing against 
ATTENDANCE and REVENUE; this shows what factors go into affecting ATTENDANCE 
and REVENUE even when not in a recessionary period.  SUBS (MLB) and TEAMS were 
significantly and positively related to NFL ATTENDANCE.  TEAMS, INCOME, and SUBS 
(NHL) positively affected MLB ATTENDANCE.  GATE, ATT, and INCOME were 
positively and significantly related to NFL REVENUE.  ATT, PRICE, and INCOME all 
heavily influence MLB REVENUE.   
 While this study is helpful in looking into which league is recession proof, which 
league shows signs of being recession proof, and which league is not recession proof, there 
are several areas that could be explored further in the future.  Within the REVENUE model, 
one of the goals was to indicate which variables, overall, affected league revenue.  However, 
some variables, such as TV/Internet contracts, merchandise sales, and concession sales, were 
not included in the model.  These variables were excluded from the model due to largely 
incomplete data sets.  If someone wished to create a more comprehensive model for 
REVENUE, they could look more deeply into these excluded variables and see how much 
they impact REVENUE and REVENUE during a recession. 
38 
 
 Another way to expand upon this study would be to see if team record during a 
recession would impact ATTENDANCE and REVENUE for these leagues.  Does a winning 
team have greater revenues and attendance during a recession than a losing team?  Coinciding 
with this, it would also be interesting to see if certain areas with sports teams are more 
recession proof.  For instance, is a team in Boston, which is a larger city with a very good 
NHL team most years, better able to withstand economic downturns than a team like Buffalo, 
a smaller city with a generally mediocre NHL team?  How does record and location coincide 
with one another to affect ATTENDANCE and REVENUE during and not during a 
recession? 
 Lastly, the LOCKOUT variable should be explored more closely within future 
studies.  How does a LOCKOUT affect REVENUE and ATTENDANCE?  Does a 
LOCKOUT more negatively affect the NHL than a recession?  Does a LOCKOUT positively 
affect the NHL and, if so, how much does the NHL benefit?  Within this study, LOCKOUT 
was insignificant, but, in future studies, it would be interesting to explore why a LOCKOUT 
is insignificant.  Finally, it would also be stimulating to see how influential a LOCKOUT is 
on the NHL as compared to a recession.   
 The hopes for this study were threefold.  Firstly, it was to underscore how pivotal 
these leagues are in the lives of Americans.  Secondly, it was to explore an unprecedented 
study.  Thirdly, this study hopes to inspire further analysis on the subject so leagues and 
teams can be aware of what influences ATTENDANCE and REVENUE most heavily to 
avoid economic hardships during future recessions.  
 
 
 
 
39 
 
VII. Appendix 
Table 13: NFL Attendance Correlation Matrix 
 
 
ATT PRICE POP INCOME RECESS UNEMPL TEAMS 
SUBS 
(MLB) 
SUBS 
(NHL) 
ATT 1 
PRICE 0.9228417 1 
POP 0.9221705 0.9860284 1 
INCOME 0.9209274 0.9739584 0.9920144 1 
RECESS -0.048394 0.0151373 -0.030584 0.04169 1 
UNEMPL 0.0476237 0.224871 0.2836274 0.25398 -0.2035 1 
TEAMS 0.9410993 0.9023066 0.9264060 0.91861 -0.051 0.12315 1 
SUBS 
(MLB) 0.9453879 0.9828919 0.9791751 0.9703 -0.0054 0.27005 0.91717 1 
SUBS 
(NHL) 
-
0.1708347 
-
0.1041316 
-
0.2077369 -0.2817 -0.1712 -0.44611 -0.24911 -0.2041 1 
 
 
Table 14: NHL Attendance Correlation Matrix 
 
ATT LOCKOUT PRICE POP INCOME RECESS UNEMPL 
SUBS 
(NFL) 
SUBS 
(MLB) TEAMS 
ATT 1 
LOCKOUT -0.254 1 
PRICE -0.011 -0.2384051 1 
POP 0.875 -0.2737818 -0.3089 1 
INCOME 0.837 -0.2551563 -0.3904 0.98964 1 
RECESS -0.089 -0.2135997 -0.2287 0.05650 0.149641 1 
UNEMPL 0.076 0.038103369 -0.4666 0.32671 0.284953 -0.207019 1 
SUBS (NFL) 0.883 -0.3078074 -0.1873 0.98607 0.971054 0.091161 0.2637873 1 
SUBS 
(MLB) 0.865 -0.2811380 -0.2773 0.98205 0.969605 0.064663 0.3127728 0.9829 1 
TEAMS 0.885 -0.38719 0.0441 0.83141 0.806019 -0.008741 -0.060422 0.8569 0.8579 1 
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Table 15: NHL Revenue Correlation Matrix  
 
 
REVENUE GATE ATT LOCKOUT PRICE POP INCOME RECESS UNEMPL 
REVENUE 1 
        
GATE 0.638786 1 
       
ATT 0.650712 0.922955016 1 
      
LOCKOUT -0.27309 -0.3144171 -0.25461024 1 
     
PRICE -0.09868 0.078883222 -0.01156102 -0.23841 1 
    
POP 0.754138 0.804518365 0.875469984 -0.27378 -0.3089 1 
   
INCOME 0.72276 0.74869771 0.837938575 -0.25516 -0.3904 0.989646859 1 
  
RECESS -0.08682 -0.08478589 -0.08939747 -0.2136 -0.2287 0.056506654 0.149642 1 
 
UNEMPL 0.3448 0.03204798 0.076089417 0.038103 -0.4666 0.326716446 0.284953 -0.20702 1 
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